What Motivates Start-up Firms When Innovations are Sequential? by 박인욱
 
 
韓國開發硏究 
제28권  제1호(통권  제97호)  
 
What Motivates Start-up Firms 
When Innovations are Sequential?  
 
In-Uck Park 
(Leverhulme Professor of Industrial Organization, Department of Economics, 
University of Bristol, U.K.) 
 
순차적인 혁신하에서 창업기업에 어떤 동기부여가 가능한가? 
 
박  인  욱 
(Bristol 대학교 Leverhulme 교수) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This paper presents a dynamic analysis of the interaction between incumbent firms and successful new 
entrepreneurs, that can provide R&D incentives when innovations are cumulative/ sequential. It is 
argued that insights of the basic model extend to varying market structures and regulatory 
environments. 
•  Key Word: Sequential Innovation(순차적인 혁신), Patent(특허권), Venture Capital(위험부
담자본) 
•  JEL code: 031 
•  Received: 2005. 9. 14     •  Referee Process Started: 2005. 7. 18       
•  Referee Reports Completed: 2006. 4. 20 
  
 ABSTRACT  
 
This paper presents a dynamic analysis of the interaction between incumbent firms and successful 
new entrepreneurs, that can provide R&D incentives when innovations are cumulative/sequential. It 
is argued that the insights of the basic model extend to varying market structures and regulatory 
environments. 
 
  
 
 
  
본 논문은 기업의 혁신이 순차(누증)적으로
일어날 때, R&D 인센티브를 제공할 수 있는 현
존 기업들과 성공적인 신임 기업가들의 관계를
동태적으로 분석한 것이다. 본고에서는 기본
모델이 다양한 시장구조와 규제환경으로 확대
(적용)될 수 있다고 주장한다. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
A distinguishing feature of modern high-tech industries, such as software and 
biotech, is that the technological progresses are made through sequential innovations 
that build upon previous innovations. Due to such sequential nature of innovations, 
the conventional approach and results on R&D that treat innovations as isolated 
events, are inadequate for modern high-tech industries. 
The conventional wisdom is that strong protection of invention/innovation (e.g., 
by patents) promotes the incentives of R&D, thereby economic growth, by rewarding 
the successful entrepreneurs through monopoly rent for the duration of patents. On 
the other hand, more protection means larger dead-weight loss of monopoly. The 
optimal patent policy, therefore, would be to balance the positive effect of providing 
incentives for worthy R&D activities, and the negative effect of allowing the 
monopoly dead-weight loss. 
When innovations are sequential (i.e., they build on previous innovations), strong 
patent protection has an extra, negative effect of discouraging R&D efforts of further 
innovation by anyone other than the patent-holder of the previous innovation,1 
because the sequential nature of further innovation means that it will infringe on the 
previous patent. Bessen and Maskin (2004) show that this negative effect can be so 
large between major rival innovators of the industry, such that stronger patent 
protection reduces (rather then promotes) their R&D activities. Scotchmer (1991) 
argues that, unlike the conventional R&D literature, “breadth” of patent protection is 
an important policy dimension in sequential/cumulative innovation, and that the 
role of patent protection is more on determining the bargaining positions in ex ante 
joint venture agreement between the current patent firm and the potential 
next-generation innovator. 
The patent's effect of discouraging further innovation is particularly important in 
industries in which many valuable discoveries are made by enthusiastic new 
entrepreneurs, such as internet and software industries. For such environments, the 
findings of Bessen and Maskin (2004) are not particularly useful because they 
analyze established rival firms in an industry, nor those of Scotchmer (1991) because 
it would be practically hard to identify the right joint venture partner from many 
unknown entrepreneurs. In this paper we present a dynamic mechanism between 
incumbent firms and successful new entrepreneurs, that may provide R&D 
incentives of the latter, hence sustain innovation process in the industry. This is 
mainly done in Section 3, preceded by preliminary discussions on a 
single-innovation case in Section 2. Then, in Section 4 we extend the findings of the 
basic model and explore the roles of startup firms in innovation processes in varying 
market structures and regulatory environments. A brief overview of these sections 
follows below. 
                                            
1 In high-tech industries there also exists a competition in a separate dimension, namely, in establishing 
your own technology as the industry platform/standard, which will expand your market base. The current 
analysis concerns successive product improvements through sequential innovations in industries with 
already established platforms. An interesting future research would be to analyze a dynamic model that 
combines both aspects of the high-tech industries. 
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Successful amateur entrepreneurs (e.g., in Silicon Valley) will form small startup 
firms with a marketable product, however, they would be much less positioned to 
market their products than an established major player of the industry (e.g., 
Microsoft). Moreover, chances are that the new product is infringing on some patents 
in a large patent portfolio of the major firm. Instead of taking legal action that is 
costly and uncertain in practice (empirically patent litigations have about 50% chance 
of winning in the US), the major firm can reach a buyout deal with the startup firm.2 
The degree of patent protection affects the bargaining positions in this deal in two 
ways: stronger protection shifts the bargaining power to the current patent-holder 
(major firm); at the same time, the major firm finds the current deal more valuable 
because its enlarged patent portfolio strengthens its future bargaining position to a 
larger extent. The latter increases the size of pie that they bargain over, thereby 
improves the bargaining outcome for the startup firm. The expected value of such 
buyout deal provides incentives for the entrepreneurs. 
In this dynamic context of sequential innovations, an optimal degree of patent 
protection is one that motivates the major firm for longest periods in buyout deals 
for future benefit, which in turn generates a share of the startup in the buyout deal 
that is sufficient to attract the entrepreneur at the beginning. As this outline of the 
analysis indicates, in industries where a pool of creative and open-minded 
entrepreneurs is important in successful innovations (relative to the in-house R&D of 
established firms), the successful small startup firms are at the centre of the engine of 
technological innovation. Accordingly, it is important to have entrepreneurial 
culture and financial systems that are favorable to small startups. This finding 
accords well with the observation that the software industry prospered much more 
in the US where venture capital for startups are developed, than in the EU where 
patent protection is much lower (which would be favorable for innovation in the 
context of Bessen and Masking). 
Note that in our setting the R&D incentives of the startups are essentially 
determined by the Nash bargaining outcome and the stronger future bargaining 
position rendered by enlarged patent portfolio. These essential forces are not affected 
by some realistic changes of the model, such as when multiple entrepreneurs engage 
in R&D race, when the firms negotiate licensing agreements rather than buyout deals, 
and when more than one major firms compete as rivals in the industry. Because 
some market power of the major firm is necessary for adequate surplus to sustain the 
R&D of startups (transmitted via Nash bargaining), one obvious concern is the 
reconciliation of limiting the market power without killing the R&D incentives. 
Competition by major firms may reduce the market power without dampening R&D 
incentives excessively, because the startup firm would have a stronger bargaining 
position with multiple potential partners. Existence of a rival firm, even of a 
medium-size, may ease this concern beyond the direct competition in current 
markets, especially if reputations of major firms matter for future demand. 
 
 
                                            
2 Westbrock (2004), for example, reports that mergers in the semiconductor and computer industry 
during 1990-2000 are concentrated on the technology leaders like Intel, 3Com, and Apple Computers, ATI 
Technologies and Broadcom. 
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Ⅱ. Preliminary: A Single-Innovation Model 
 
 
Consider an industry consisting of two asymmetric firms: Firm 1 is an incumbent 
(dominant) firm (e.g., Microsoft) and firm 2 is a startup. Firm 2 can engage in R&D at 
a cost 0>C , which will result in a successful innovation with probability 0>π . The 
value of successful innovation from the perspective of supplier is V  if firm 2 
commercializes it, whereas it is worth more, say VV >∗ , if firm 1 does. The value of 
unsuccessful R&D is 0. 
Due to the sequential nature, the new innovation builds on previous technology 
owned/patented by firm 1. If firm 1 litigates, therefore, firm 2 loses the case with 
probability p : In this case the new technology is freely available to anyone, 
lowering its actual value to firm 1 down to ∗bV , 10 ≤≤ b . Its value to firm 2 in this 
case would be much smaller, which we assume to be 0 for convenience. On the other 
hand, if firm 2 wins the case (which happens with probability p−1 ), firm 2 gets a 
patented ownership of the innovation and captures the full value V . A stronger IP 
protection is captured by higher p . A litigation incurs costs of 0≥ic  to firm i ,  
2,1=i , although we assume 021 == cc  here for expositional ease. 
Instead of litigation, firm 1 can negotiate a buyout deal with firm 2. We model 
this process as a Nash bargaining as follows. Should they fail to reach a deal, they 
will end up in a court. Hence, the disagreement/threat points of the firms are the 
respective expected surpluses from litigation, i.e., 
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Since ∗V  is the maximum value of the technology for the suppliers, the two 
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where )1,0(/: ∈= ∗VVr . These will be the equilibrium outcome of the 
                                            
3 See, e.g., Myerson (1997). 
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single-innovation model. Hence, we have 
PROPOSITION 1: In the single-innovation model the firms would reach an equilibrium 
buyout deal that splits ∗V  into )(1 ps  and )(2 ps  above, hence firm 2 will invest in R&D 
if and only if Cps ≥)(2π . Stronger IP protection decreases (increases) the share of firm 2 
(firm 1) via weakening (strengthening) its bargaining position and thereby, reduces the 
innovation incentives of the startup firm. 
 
 
Ⅲ. A Sequential Model 
 
 
We follow Bessen and Maskin (2004) closely in enriching the model to 
accommodate sequential innovation. There are infinite periods indexed by L,2,1=t , 
in each period of which firm 2, if invested in R&D, succeeds in an innovation with 
probability π , that has commercial values of ∗V  and V  to firms 1 and 2, 
respectively. Here, firm 2 is a new firm that arrives in each period4 while firm 1 is 
long-lived.5 To avoid the so-called replacement effect, as in Bessen and Maskin (2004), 
we suppose that these values are incremental values. 
If there is no IP protection (i.e., 0=p ), what can happen to firm 1 in the future is 
independent of what happens in the current period and, therefore, the two firms 
bargain over ∗V  in every period. With a positive level of IP protection, the value of 
owning the innovation to firm 1 is ∗V  (direct value) plus the increment in future 
bargaining share due to a strengthened bargaining position via an enlarged patent 
portfolio (which pushes up future p ). Since the increased value of owning the new 
technology for firm 1 increases what the firms bargain over, it can improve the 
bargaining outcome of the firm 2. Hence, some positive level of IP protection may 
give more R&D incentive to startup firms than no protection. To capture this effect, 
we need to define p  as a function of both the degree of IP protection and the size 
of firm 1's patent portfolio L,2,1,0=L . 
We model the level of IP protection by a parameter ]2/1,0[∈z  in the following 
manner. Since 0=L  means no IP to protect, 0)0( =zp  for all z , where the 
argument of zp  is L . Then, the k -th patent added to firm 1's portfolio increases p  
by kz  : that is, zpz =)1( , 2)2( zzpz += , and   
.)(
1
k
L
k
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REMARKS: (1) Not having a patent on an innovation would reduce p  in reality 
but not modelled. This would only reinforce our message because firm 1 would have 
less bargaining power when it reduces p . (2) The impact of the k -th patent of firm 
                                            
4 In reality, many potential innovators may engage in R&D race. This is not likely to change our main 
results as discussed in Section 4.1. 
5 In reality, firm 1 may also engage in R&D. In this case firm 2 needs to succeed in innovation before 
firm 1 to get the benefits, hence has less incentive to invest in R&D. This does not change the qualitative 
results of the paper, although it dampens the effect of patent protection on promoting R&D by start-up 
firms. 
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1 would differ depending on how many previous inventions are not in L , which we 
also abstract from. This should not matter for the qualitative results.  
If 0=z , every period is separate as explained earlier, and the buyout deal would 
be the same as in Section 2 with 0=p . In particular, each period the surplus of the 
startup firm that undertook R&D is 2/)1(:)0(2
∗+= Vrs ππ . Depending on the size of 
R&D cost C  relative to )0(2sπ , either there will be R&D by startup (hence, 
innovation with probability π ) in every period, or there will be no R&D at all. For 
each of these two cases, we examine the effects of positive levels of IP protection, i.e., 
0>z . 
 
 
1. The Case of R&D When 0=z   
 
If Cs >)0(2π  there will be R&D every period when there is no IP protection, 
i.e., 0=z . Hence, IP protection ( 0>z ) does not induce any innovation that would 
not have been possible without it. Nonetheless, we examine the innovation 
incentives in this case, for it would help understand the analysis in the other case. 
 
Let zˆ  be such that Cps z =∞))(( ˆ2π . Then, 
 
[A] for any zz ˆ< , firm 2 invests in R&D in every period. 
 
To see this, observe that in each period i) firms 1 and 2 bargain over a total 
surplus exceeding ∗V  if there is an innovation, ii) )(ˆ ∞< zpp , and iii) the 
disagreement points are the same as when there was no future (because once they go 
to the court, the firm 1 does not own the new innovation even if it wins the case as 
described in Section 2, hence the incremental value due to an enlarged patent 
portfolio is foregone). Since i) means that the surplus they bargain over is larger than 
that of the single-innovation case, and ii) and iii) imply that the bargaining position 
of firm 2 is better than that in the single-innovation case for )(ˆ ∞zp , it follows that 
the expected value of Nash bargaining outcome for firm 2 is larger than 
Cps z =∞))(( ˆ2π .  
If zz ˆ> , on the other hand, for large enough L  firm 2 would not find it 
profitable to invest in R&D, because the total surplus to bargain over becomes 
arbitrarily close to ∗V  and so do the disagreement points to those in the absence of 
future, while p  exceeds )(ˆ ∞zp , hence the expected value of Nash bargaining 
outcome for firm 2 goes below ))(( ˆ2 ∞zpsπ , i.e., it would not recover the R&D cost. 
Let ∗L  denote the largest portfolio size for which R&D takes place. For any ∗< LL , 
R&D takes place as well because, relative to ∗L , the total surplus to bargain over is 
larger and p  is lower (and the disagreement points are the same as when there was 
no future). That is,  
 
[B] if zz ˆ> , firm 2 invests in R&D until firm 1's portfolio reaches a certain size, then 
no more R&D takes place. 
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2. The Case of No R&D When 0=z   
 
In this case it seems plausible to anticipate that IP protection can promote 
innovation in early stages of technology development, i.e., for low L , by enlarging 
the total surplus to bargain over. The innovation process, though, would inevitably 
stop eventually, because the total surplus to bargain over will converge back to ∗V  
as the value of an additional patent dwindles to nil. However, this reasoning is 
self-contradictory: in the last period that R&D is supposed to take place, firm 2 
would not have an incentive to invest in R&D because it would bargain with firm 1 
over no more than ∗V  and have a worse bargaining position than when 0=z  
due to positive p . This appears to suggest a disturbing conclusion that, unlike the 
anticipation above, innovation would never take place in equilibrium. 
This result, however, is an artifact of the simplifying assumption that all startups 
have the same cost of carrying out their R&D. Hence, we relax this assumption 
minimally as follows: 
  (α) In each period there is some chance, a probability 0>η , that the R&D cost 
of the startup (firm 2) in that period is small, normalized to 0, instead of C . The 
realized R&D cost is private information of the firm 2 in each period. 
Note that firm 2 will engage in R&D in any period if the cost is 0, hence an 
innovation will come forth with at least probability ηπ  in every future period. 
Recall that we are currently considering the case in which firm 2 will not invest in 
R&D if cost is C  when there is no IP protection ( 0=z ). Now, return to check the 
presumed equilibrium described above in this section. Again, the innovation process 
would inevitably stop eventually by the same reason. Consider the last period ∗L  
that firm 2 would invest in R&D regardless of its cost. Since innovations will come 
forth with probability ηπ  in each future period, firm 1 would extract more surplus 
in the future if it had patent on the current innovation. Therefore, the total surplus to 
bargain over is larger than ∗V  by at least a certain amount, and firm 2 may still have 
an incentive to invest C  in R&D even if its bargaining position is worse than when 
0=z  (i.e., even if 0>p ). This last period is one such that adding the current 
innovation to firm 1's patent portfolio will render firm 1's bargaining position strong 
enough that firm 2's share of the next pie to bargain over (which will be smaller than 
the current pie) does not recover C . Indeed such last period can exist in equilibrium. 
Furthermore, R&D takes place in any previous period because the pie is larger and 
firm 2 has a better bargaining position due to a smaller portfolio of firm 1. 
For illustration, fix 1,5.5,1.0,5.0,10 ===== πCrbV  and  9.0=δ . Then, it is 
straightforward calculation to verify that, for all 5.00 << z , the startup firm will 
invest in R&D regardless of its cost if 0=L , but not if 1≥L  unless when the R&D 
cost is zero. Furthermore, for higher values of η  and/or δ  the future value of 
having a larger portfolio is greater for firm 1, enlarging the size of pie to bargain over. 
Hence, the startup may invest in R&D when 1=L  as well, and possibly for larger 
L : For instance, this is so for large )5.0(<z  when 6.0>η  or δ  is near 1. The 
calculations for these illustrations are done by Mathematica and are available from the 
author upon request. 
One obvious question of interest is the level of IP protection ( z ) that maximizes 
∗L , i.e., that induces R&D investments from high-cost startups as long as possible. It 
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is straightforward to see that higher z  is not always better, because p  will get 
high very quickly, which is detrimental for firm 2's bargaining outcome. Hence, the 
optimal IP protection would be an intermediate level such that the value of the first 
patent is large enough (i.e., the pie in the first period to bargain is large enough) to 
drive up the innovation process via motivating the early-arriving high cost startups, 
but not too large to give excessive bargaining power to firm 1 prematurely that will 
discourage R&D investment.6 However, it will be technically complex to give a full 
characterization or a general calculation formula of the optimal level of z . We 
summarize the discussions so far as below, which is a version of the findings in 
Panagopoulos and Park (2005). 
 
PROPOSITION 2: Consider the sequential model described above with the cost 
uncertainty as in (α ). If Cs >)0(2 , high-cost startup firms will always invest in R&D 
when IP protection is sufficiently low, including 0=z . If Cs <)0(2 , high-cost startup 
firms will never invest in R&D for sufficiently low z . In this case, it is possible to induce 
R&D from high-cost startups by increasing IP protection, until firm 1's patent portfolio 
reaches a certain size: The optimal z  that maximizes this critical portfolio size is an 
intermediate level such that early patents in the portfolio are valued sufficiently highly by 
firm 1 for their impact in strengthening firm 1' future bargaining position, but not too 
quickly to discourage startup firm's R&D incentives too soon. 
 
 
Ⅳ. The R&D Motives of Startup Firms 
 
 
The analysis in the previous section suggests certain ways that may enhance and 
sustain the R&D motives of startup firms even when the innovations are sequential. 
Although the analysis is carried out on a simplified model in the previous section, 
the basic insights can be extended to varied market structures and regulation 
regimes. 
 
 
1. Multiple Startups in R&D Race 
 
In the base model we postulated that there is a single startup in each period. More 
generally, however, there may be multiple startup firms competing in R&D activities 
to be the first in succeeding in innovation. In the standard case that the startup firms 
are ex ante symmetric, each firm's incentive is lower than when there is a single firm 
because the probability of winning the R&D race is smaller when there are 
competitors. In equilibrium, the number of firms who engage in the race is the 
maximum number such that each firm's prospect of winning justifies the R&D cost, 
because any additional firm in the race would reduce the expected value of R&D 
                                            
6 Put differently, higher z means that the size of pie to bargain over is larger because the current deal 
would improve firm 1's future bargaining position, i.e., firm 1 “borrows” some part of its future bargaining 
shares. This borrowing should be large enough (i.e., z not too low) so that the early-arrived firm 2's shares 
are large enough to justify R&D investment, but not too large (i.e., z not too large) to deplete future pies too 
quickly and thereby, destroy firm 2's R&D incentives. 
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investment below its cost. This does not affect the fundamental roles of startup firms 
in industries with sequential innovations, but entails some changes in details as 
noted below. 
Since the number of startup firms engaging in R&D is (weakly) larger than the 
case of a single startup,7 the probability of innovation is higher in each period. This 
would speed up the innovation process for a given IP protection level. 
When multiple startup firms invest in R&D, a question arises as to whether the 
individually rational multiple R&D decisions are inefficient from the perspectives of 
social welfare. It is possible, therefore, that the authority may find reducing IP 
protection desirable in the face of multiple potential startups, to prevent socially 
excessive, duplicative R&D activities. 
 
 
2. Licensing Instead of Buyouts 
 
The base model considered the case that the incumbent firm negotiates a buyout 
deal with the new innovator for a mutually beneficial outcome relative to the 
alternative of costly and uncertain legal proceedings, hence the incumbent retains the 
market power as long as a deal is reached. Although modelling out-of-court 
negotiations in this way allows cleaner analysis, such outright takeovers/mergers 
may not be prevalent for various reasons such as antitrust regulations. An alternative 
form of negotiation feasible in practice is licensing agreements: the startup firm 
markets its own product but pays royalties to the incumbent for the right to use the 
previous state of art which its own innovation is built upon. The essential findings of 
the previous section carry through when the firms negotiate licensing agreements 
instead of buyout deals, because the equilibrium terms of licensing agreement would 
be qualitatively the same bargaining outcome as the buyout deal, albeit over a 
different amount of total surplus. There are, however, the following additional 
considerations. 
The equilibrium terms of licensing agreement would be a result of bargaining as 
before. The exact terms would depend on how the post-license market works, 
because it determines what they bargain over. If the two firms behave collusively (i.e., 
as if a cartel), then the analysis would be identical to the previous section. If the firms 
behave more competitively, the consumers would benefit but it may be harder to 
provide adequate R&D incentives due to reduced profit from competition. The 
overall effect would also depend on whether the new innovation provides a 
complementary product to the previous state of art or a substitute for it. We 
elaborate a little bit on this presuming that the incumbent firm behaves as a 
Stackelberg leader after the licensing agreement. 
First, if the startup supplies a substitute for the previous state of art supplied by 
firm 1, then the two firms are in direct competition. The price of firm 1 would be 
lower compared with the case that the firm 1 solely supplies both products after a 
buyout deal. The price of firm 2, however, would be under a downward pressure 
from competition on the one hand, but at the same time under an upward pressure 
                                            
7 Note that it cannot be smaller for any given IP protection: If a high cost firm were to invest in the base 
model and multiple firms would not engage in a race, then one firm would still find it profitable to invest. 
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due to the higher marginal cost of firm 2 by the amount of royalty. (This upward 
pressure disappears if the royalty is lump-sum rather than per unit of sale.) Unlike 
the price of firm 1, therefore, firm 2's price may not be lower under licensing 
agreement than under a buyout deal, hence the comparison of social welfare may be 
ambiguous between the two scenarios. In addition, competition reduces the total 
surplus for the firms to bargain over, thereby the startup firm's share as well. 
Consequently, the R&D investment by high-cost startups may not be sustained as 
long under license agreement, reducing the prospects of continued innovations. 
A standard result for complementary products is that their prices are lower when 
supplied by a single firm than when supplied by separate firms, because the single 
supplier internalizes the positive effect of supplying one product on the demand of 
the other, hence produces more than two separate firms that do not benefit from 
such effect.8 If the new innovation is a complementary product, therefore, both the 
consumer surplus and the producer surplus would be lower under licensing 
agreement than under buyout deal. Consequently, the R&D investment by high-cost 
startups would be lower under license agreement. All of these suggest that the social 
welfare would be lower under license agreement than under buyout deal if the 
innovations provide complementary products to the previous state of art.9 
 
 
3. Oligopoly Incumbents 
 
Modern high-tech industries typically exhibit high market concentration among a 
small number of major firms, nonetheless the assumption of monopoly incumbent in 
the base model is a special case. When there are multiple incumbent firms, the 
competition among them would dampen the potential surplus from an innovation. 
Since this dampened surplus would be reflected in the bargaining share of the 
startup firm, it seems at first sight that multiple incumbents would reduce R&D 
incentives of the startup firms. This indeed would be the case if there is one clear 
incumbent firm whose patent portfolio the new innovation may have infringed on, 
hence any deal would be between the startup and this incumbent firm but no other. 
On the other hand, due to the interdependent nature of technology, if there are 
multiple incumbent firms that the innovation may have infringed on, then there are 
at least two reasons why this is not necessarily the case. The first is a relatively 
straightforward observation that the startup firm would be in a strengthened 
bargaining position when multiple firms compete to become a partner in the deal.10 
The second reason comes from the fact that the value of owning the innovation for 
an incumbent firm is the difference in profit between when it owns the innovation 
and when one of its rival firms owns it. Since this difference is larger when there are 
significant rival firms, striking a deal may be more valuable for an incumbent when 
there are rivals than when there is none, which may in turn has a favorable effect on 
                                            
8 See, for example, Shapiro, C. (1989). 
9 When there exists a competing product (substitute) for one of the products, potential antitrust issues 
arise from the possible practice of refusing to sell the two products separately (foreclosure). 
10  In principle, there can patent-infringement litigation by another major firm on the acquired 
innovation through a buyout deal. We abstract from this complication, say, by assuming that the 
head-to-head court confrontation between two major firms are too costly for both parties. 
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the bargaining share of the startup. This aspect may also have a dynamic strategic 
effect if an incumbent firm's good reputation shifts future demand in favor of that 
firm: current reputable behavior would improve a firm's position in future 
bargaining by reducing the potential value of innovation for rival firms, thereby their 
desirability as potential partners for the startup firm. Note that this reasoning would 
not be affected when some incumbent firms are smaller than others. Hence, existence 
of even a med-size firm may restrain the dominant firm’s market power beyond its 
direct competition, by becoming a tougher rival in buyout deals the more market 
power the dominant firm exercises. 
 
 
Ⅴ. Summary 
 
 
Reflecting the prominent features of modern high-tech industries, we consider 
environments in which innovations are sequential, hence further innovation efforts 
are discouraged due to the potential threat of patent-infringement litigation. We 
present a dynamic analysis of the interaction between incumbent firms and 
successful new entrepreneurs, that can provide R&D incentives of the latter, thereby 
sustain innovation process. We argue that the insights of the basic model on the 
degree of IP protection and the roles of startup firms in the innovation process, 
extend to varying market structures and regulatory environments. These discussions 
identify some of the main factors and their interactions that determine the R&D 
dynamics, which can be useful in policy considerations. 
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